The Argument from Unnecessary Suffering

 Christians have a tendency to claim their god is perfect. They describe Him as being all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. The “argument from evil” [1] says that given the way the world is, God cannot be that way. The first and still the most succinct form of that argument goes back to Epicurus (340-279 BCE). Here is his argument:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence comes evil? Is he neither willing nor able? Then why call him God?”

Theists have developed “sophisticated” responses to the argument. These arguments mainly fall into the category that “evil” has some secondary gain to it. One argument is that the human traits which produce evil (wanton cruelty, egoism, hatred etc.) are an innate part of humanity. You can’t have humans without those qualities, therefore God could not have made humans without evil. I don’t find this very convincing. Name any act of evil you can think of. If someone didn’t commit it would that person not be human? I think the answer is clearly that person would still retain his/her humanness. If that is so, then there is no act of evil that is an innate part of humanity. Nor does this apologetic apply to natural evils like hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.

But by far the most popular defense against the argument of evil is “free will” argument. Free will can lead to both good and evil. In the world, the good outweighs the evil. Since you can’t have free will without the potential for evil and if evil comes of it it is due to humanity not to God. So God cannot be held accountable for that.

I find the power of these arguments lie in the murkiness of their assumptions. Free will cannot be operationally defined. It is something that we all feel like we have, but since we do not have access to another person’s feelings we can never be sure that others actually have it or not. As neuroscience progresses we now know we cannot be assured that WE have it either. Just because we feel like we do, does not mean we actually due. Our behavior results from the actions of neurons and neurons act by inanimate ions crossing their membranes. They either produce an action potential or not and this is based solely on the laws of physics. If at the moment of decision and you could split the universe into any number of identical universes then the person making that decision would have their neurons subject to the same laws of physics and the ions crossing the membrane would do exactly the same thing. The person would make the same decision in every universe. [S]he would experience the same doubts, the same evaluation process (ie the same things that give rise to the feeling of free will), and would come to the same decision every time.

But in any case, this is all a distraction. Theists do not recognize the bind they put themselves into by positing an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. To illustrate this I have put my own spin on the argument. I call it the argument from unnecessary suffering. The argument deals with suffering, not evil directly. It also makes an operational definition of free will less important. It puts the onus on the person who claims that free will is the “greater good” that results from the suffering to show how free will (a) would disappear if the suffering were prevented and (b) that free will couldn’t have been maintained with less suffering.

First, let’s put forth some definitions:

(1) Omnipotence: having the ability to do anything that is logically possible to do. I use the term “logically possible” to exclude simplistic arguments like if God were omnipotent then he should be able to make a rock so big that even he cannot move it; but if he cannot move it then he can’t be omnipotent. It is simply not logically possible to have both an immovable object and an irresistible force.

(2) Omniscient: knowing everything that is logically possible to know. Again, I used the term “logically possible” to exclude arguments that miss the point I am trying to make. For instance, in quantum physics there is the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle which says that particles can have entangled properties (position and speed for example) which have a degree of uncertainty to them. The more you know about the position of a particle the less you know about its speed and vice versa. So it is not logically possible to know both of those things.

(3) Omnibenevolence: Desiring the best possible outcome for everything in the universe.

(4) Omnimax: Having the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

(4) Unnecessary Suffering: ANY suffering beyond a minimal amount necessary to achieve a secondary greater good. This allows one to postulate that suffering may lead to a greater good, but if God is as theists say He must not produce suffering beyond the least possible to achieve that goal.

Here are the premises:

P1: An omniscient God would know that unnecessary suffering exists.

P2: An omnipotent God would be able to prevent it.

P3: An omnibenevolent God would want to prevent it

P4: Unnecessary suffering exist

Here is the conclusion from the premises:

C: If there was an omnimax God then there would be no unnecessary suffering. Since it does there cannot be an omnimax God.

This is a valid logical argument. The conclusion is derived directly from the premises. But logically valid is not the same as logically true. For an argument to be logically true, all the premises must be true. P1, P2, and P3 are true because they come directly from the definition of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. P4 is an assertion. So IF you are going to argue that this argument is not logically true, your only course of action is to argue that P4 is not true. Or, in other words, you have to argue that in reality there is no unnecessary suffering. All suffering that has ever existed was no more than the minimal amount to achieve some secondary gain … free will or anything else you might want to propose as the secondary gain.

But what does that entail? Suppose you hear on the news about a child being kidnapped, tortured for weeks, then killed. If there is no unnecessary suffering you must think that HAD to take place in exactly that way AND that the world is a better place for it. Good luck trying to tell that to the grieving parents. They would think you a heartless piece of shit … and I would agree with them.

You would have to think that the 6,000,000 Jews killed in the holocaust had to die in the way they did for the world to be as good as it is now. That if 5,999,999 Jews had died whatever secondary gains came out of it would not have been achieved. Not only that but the Jews had to have died the way they did. Kids sucking up the Zyklon B into their lungs in a last ditch desperate act to simply breath. If even one had died in a less painful way then the secondary gain would not have been achieved.

In 2004, a tsunami started on the west coast of Indonesia killed 230,000 people. Not a one of those deaths was connected with anyone’s free will. Not a one of those deaths were due to some necessary inherent human characteristic. What secondary gains were achieved by this? What would have stopped those secondary gains from being achieved if only 229,999 people had died?

Several years ago, Texas had a severe drought. In the midst of it I walked a trail in a nearby state park. The trail had a blackish tint to it that I had not noticed before. That tint was due to dead ants … thousands if not millions of them. They died from the heat and dehydration. That was suffering. What secondary gains justify that? If they needed to die couldn’t they have died in less gruesome manner?

My assertion is that there is so much suffering in the world, it is ridiculous and irresponsible to think all of leads to a secondary gain that justifies it. It is beyond reasonable doubt that at least some of the suffering that happens is unnecessary. I would go so far as to say that the vast majority of it does not lead any secondary gains that would justify it. And if that is true, then God cannot be omnimax.

It should be noted that this argument does not disprove the existence of a god, just the existence of an omnimax god. But don’t stop there. Consider the significance of that. Does God not know that there is unnecessary suffering? Then He isn’t omniscient. If He isn’t omniscient and doesn’t know about all the unnecessary suffering that goes on in the world, what else does He not know?

Is God unable to stop unnecessary suffering? The he is not omnipotent. If he doesn’t have the power to stop a single ant from suffering, what else does he not have the power to do? It certainly seems to me it would be easier to stop an ant from suffering than to cure cancer. So why are you praying for just that?

Does God not care that unnecessary suffering exist? The he is malevolent. What else does he not care about? If he doesn’t care about the 230,000 people who died in tsunami, why should he care about you?

Any way you look at it … God comes across as not such a good guy. Perhaps this can best explained by postulating that God doesn’t exist at all.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] See Wikipedia entry on PROBLEM OF EVIL for a short discussion on the history.